The Navy Years

How did the navy use the lands that they expropriated?
The fertile western part of the island became the Naval Ammunition Facility (NAF) covering some 8,000 acres. This was the magazine area. More than 100 dome roofed warehouses were constructed; their roofs covered with soil and planted with grass so that from the air they would look like nothing more than empty fields. Armaments of all kinds and categories were stored inside the magazines.

Navy lands on the east became the Inner Range of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility (AFWTF). This was divided into the Eastern Maneuver Area (EMA), the Surface Impact Range (SIA) and the Live Impact Area (LIA).

The EMA was used for such activities as a small arms range, practice minefields, electronic warfare and mock amphibious assaults.

The SIA was used for practice shelling from ground artillery positions and from warships offshore

The LIA was for the target for the really big stuff, bombs dropped from jet aircraft, missiles fired from ships planes and for the testing of an assortment of both conventional and non conventional weapons. Non conventional usually refers to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Non conventional weapons tested on Vieques that the public kows about include depleted uranium artillery shells, Agent Orange, napalm, chaff (an aluminum coated fiberglass dust that serves to form a cloud impenetrable to radar) and in 1966, a “test bomb with nuclear characteristics” that was meant to be dropped on Vieques, but accidentally was dropped in the sea between St. Thomas and Vieques. (The bomb was recovered at great expense by a crack team of divers aided by dolphins from the Navy’s then super secret animal research laboratory.

In addition to the land areas on Vieques, the surrounding waters, which the navy called the “Outer Range,” were used for an assortment of bombing, missile and artillery exercises.

How did the Viequenses benefit from the navy base?
Until the closing of the Marine base in the 1970s, Camp Garcia housed about 300 marines on a semi permanent basis. The “Navy Base” on Vieques, however, was not really a base at all in the traditional sense of the word. It was a target; a target for use by the US military, and available for rent to foreign nations. In military parlance, it was a “stand-alone” bombing range, in that it was located outside of the supporting navy base, which was Roosevelt Roads on the Big Island.

There were no parade grounds, no major facilities for the housing of a semi permanent community of officers and enlisted men who would stay on the island, contributing to the economy. In short, aside from a few menial jobs in maintenance and security, Vieques didn’t benefit at all.

You know, I think that obviously there's a recognition that, you know, there are needs that the -- the clear needs that the people of Vieques deserve; I mean, if you compare the situation of Vieques to what other training locations -- say, in the continental United States, you'll find that the people of Vieques have for a number of years borne the burdens of hosting a training range without many of the rewards. If you compare that to training ranges, you know, around bases here in the United States, for example, you'll find that these states host a large number of troops. These troops live in the community. They buy cars at the local dealerships. They eat at the local restaurants. They go to the local schools. That draws impact aid, you know, to those communities so that there's a clear benefit to having a base in your state, for example. The people of Vieques do not host the same -- you know, a volume of Navy personnel.
Mr. P.J. Crowley, Navy public relations officer, at the Pentagon news briefing for President Clinton's January directives on Vieques

The navy’s position was that Vieques was essential for maintaining the battle readiness of the Atlantic Fleet and for the training of U.S., NATO, South American and Caribbean allied forces. Concern for the people of the island and their well being it seemed needed to take a back seat to what the navy said was indispensable for the national defense.

For example, in 1960, when the Puerto Rican government succeeded in convincing the Woolner Corporation to develop a multimillion dollar resort near Sun Bay, the navy stood in the way. The complex was to include a marina, golf course and luxury hotel. After Woolner spent a million dollars on preliminary plans, the navy squelched the project by refusing to grant air rights for the civilian planes that would bring tourists to the resort. Furthermore the navy announced that if the corporation did build a resort on Vieques, they could not guarantee that it wouldn’t be expropriated in the future.

The navy’s position as presented by a spokesperson was that “the U.S. government has spent more than $100 million in developing Vieques and Roosevelt Roads. We’re not going to throw away such an investment so that Vieques should be converted into a Mecca for tourism.”

The navy’s intentions for Vieques became even clearer when the secret “Dracula Plan” became public. The proposal was to remove the entire population of Vieques and Culebra and move them to St. Croix. As no one would be allowed to return the plan included provisions to dig up the bodies in the islands’ cemeteries and send them to St. Croix as well. The plan was scrapped after President John F Kennedy was convinced that the resulting poor public relations would be detrimental.

In 1964, the navy formulated secret plans to expropriate the southern coast of Vieques that still remained accessible to the public in order to create a corridor connecting their eastern and western holdings. This would mean that the major public beaches, Sun Bay, Media Luna and Navío would become navy property.

When news of this plan inadvertently was leaked to the press, Viequenses organized the Committee for the Defense of Vieques, which was headed by the Mayor of Vieques, Antonio Rivera. The committee organized massive demonstrations on Vieques and sent a delegation of Viequenses to Washington DC to plead their case. As a result of their efforts, the navy's plan to expropriate the remaining southern coast was blocked.

The navy’s perception of Vieques as an island that existed to serve their military needs and nothing more is illustrated nicely in this anecdote written by Brigadier General W.W. Harris in Puerto Rico's fighting 65th Infantry.

It was not all work and no play prior to the maneuvers…For my part I went fishing. I had mentioned to my assistants Ramos and Vargas that I liked to fish, so they arranged to take me one day. It had been decided that they take me on a Saturday. I suggested that we get an early start, like about four in the morning, when the fish usually bite the best.

“We don’t have to go so early, sir," Ramos said. “We can catch them anytime,” he continued.

Since they both seemed convinced that we could do pretty well at any hour of the day, I figured that they knew what they were doing and there was no use debating the subject. So it was decided that we would leave immediately after breakfast.

At the agreed hour both of them drove up to the front of my tent in a jeep and away we went. I noted that there were no fishing poles or other gear, and I commented about it. But they both assured me that they had everything that was needed., and I dropped the subject.

I guess we had been driving about 45 minutes when we stopped at an old wooden dock well hidden in a cove on the south side of the island….

As we walked onto the pier, I asked again about the fishing equipment.

“We have it, sir," Vargas said with a big grin on his face.

When I looked at Ramos for confirmation, he, too, was grinning like a Cheshire cat.

“OK, fellas, what’s the gag?" I asked, knowing that they were up to something. I had hardly gotten the words out of my mouth when Ramos showed me four or five blocks of TNT, the half pound type used by army engineers in their demolition work.

"This is it, sir."

I am sure that I must have had a startled look on my face when I asked, “Isn’t that a bit illegal?”

"No, sir," they both answered.

“This is the way we always fish, sir," Ramos replied. “We don’t have any laws about fishing here, sir,” he continued.

And when I thought about it I guessed that he was right. Certainly the navy would not have gone through the trouble to establish any laws on the island when all they wanted was something to shoot at. Nor would the Puerto Rican government have been expected to exercise any control over this little piece of land while the navy was using it for this purpose.

Social Problems
Vieques being a short term venue for military maneuvers and war games brought their own problems. Although during the 1950s and 1960s, Camp Garcia housed only a relatively small contingent of semi permanent Marine personnel, during war games and special maneuvers there could be as many as 90,000 marines on the island. This had a significant social cost. At night the marines on leave would roam the streets often getting drunk and harassing local women. Prostitution, alcoholism and street violence became commonplace on an island that once lived in peace and harmony.

April 4, 1953, an elderly man, Pepé Mapepé Christian, was beaten and kicked to death and another old man Julio Bermúdez was seriously injured by a gang of drunken marines. The autopsy report indicated that Mapepé was punched and kicked so severely that could easily stick a finger into the encephalitic mass of his skull. Two of his assailants were apprehended and tried by a military tribunal that found them innocent.

In the 1970s, the Navy, bowing to mounting pressure in Culebra, ceased their bombing operations there. Vieques was the new site for testing the big bombs and missiles launched from fighter jets, bombers and Navy warships. Also during the 1970s, the Vieques fishermen rose to the forefront of the anti-bombing protest movement.

The Vieques Fishermen's Association and the Beginning of the Fishermen's War
from a conversation with Carlos (Taso) Zenón

Photo by Ramon Korff

In 1975, the fishermen of Vieques formed the Vieques Fishermen’s Association. The group was not created to oppose the presence of the US Navy in Vieques, but rather to address more immediate problems such as the lack of a dock and a proper location to clean, process and sell fish.

Most fishermen in Vieques used fish traps as a mainstay of their art. The traps, locally called nasas, are made of chicken wire and reinforced with saltwater-resistant wooden sticks cut from local trees. They are generally set in 60 to 150 feet of water and are attached to a line leading to a floating buoy about one foot in diameter. The traps are hauled by hand about every two days.

A major problem for the Viequense fishermen was that the large naval ships were running over the fish trap buoys and cutting the line leading to the traps. When this happens, the traps, which represent a good deal of time and money to the fishermen, are lost forever.

One night in 1977, 131 fish trap buoys were cut.

It was at this juncture that the Vieques Fishermen’s Association entered the political arena. The Association brought a lawsuit against the United States Navy for the loss of these traps.

Hoping to squash the case before it went to trial, the Navy asked for, and was granted, a change of venue, so that the trial would be heard in Virginia instead of Puerto Rico. This was a severe problem for the fishermen, who basically had no money.

Nonetheless, the fishermen were able to get together the airfare and sent a delegation including the president of the Association, Carlos (Taso) Zenón. They found lodging in the cheapest of motels, ate as economically as possible, and to the surprise of Navy attorneys, appeared at court.

At the hearing, the judge was sympathetic to the fishermen. He admonished the Navy lawyers for their tactic of forcing the poor fishermen who he knew had little money and who spoke Spanish to travel to the mainland United States to appear in court. The judge found for the fishermen and the Navy had to reimburse them for the lost fish traps.

The fishermen were emboldened. It was their first real victory against the Navy.

In February of 1978, the Navy announced that 20 member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be conducting maneuvers in and around Vieques for 28 days and that during that time no fishing boats would be allowed to leave port.
In response, Taso and a delegation of fishermen traveled to the Roosevelt Roads Naval Base on the Big Island and met with the Admiral in charge, William Flanagan. During the meeting it was explained that a 28-day moratorium on fishing would deal a devastating blow to the fishermen. They had no other means of support. They would not be able to provide for their families.

The Admiral’s response was that the fishermen should apply for food stamps.
Taso looked the Admiral in the eye and said, “You don’t know my people. You are going to have problems.”

The delegation returned to Vieques and called an emergency meeting of the Fishermen’s Association. Taso told the assembly that Admiral Flanagan suggested that they could all line up for food stamps at the welfare office. The expression on the faces of the fishermen clearly expressed how they felt about giving up fishing and collecting welfare instead. Then Taso announced, “We are going to fight.”

One of the fishermen asked exactly how they could fight against the battleships, helicopters and planes of the NATO forces. Nonetheless, the fishermen came up with a plan.

The Navy announced to the press that the NATO exercises would begin with an amphibious landing at Blue Beach where 2,500 fully armed marines would be brought ashore in less than 45 minutes.

The fishermen made their own announcement. They told the media that the Vieques Fishermen’s Association was not going to allow even one marine to land on Blue Beach that day. The newspaper and media people were intrigued. They sent reporters and photographers from major newspapers and television and radio syndications to be on hand to document the confrontation.

On the morning of the planned amphibious assault, 18 fishing boats left Esperanza en route to Red Beach. Each boat had two men aboard. In addition, two larger boats carrying the reporters and photographers from the news media joined the flotilla.

The two opposing forces met just offshore from the idyllic tropical beach known to the Viequenses as Bahia de la Chiva and to the Navy as Blue Beach. On one side were the giant warships of the NATO superpowers, and on the other, the small open wooden fishing boats of the Viequense fishermen.

The image of the Navy boats running over the fish trap buoys and cutting the lines with their propellers may have inspired the fishermen's strategy, because each of their boats carried aboard a fish trap buoy attached to a line, except that this time the line did not have a fish trap at the other end. It had a length of heavy iron chain.

At a signal from the commanding officer, the marines climbed down rope ladders onto amphibious landing craft which, one by one proceeded at full throttle toward the beach.
A Viequense fishing boat sped toward the first approaching amphibious landing craft as if it was going to crash into the large vessel head on. At the last minute, the Viequense captain deftly maneuvered his little boat so that it veered off passing just to one side of the bow of Navy boat. The other fisherman aboard then threw the fish trap buoy into the water. Then the captain turned the little boat around in a tight circle and sped in front of the oncoming landing craft. Meanwhile, the other fisherman let out the line until he was left holding only the chain. At this point, the captain stopped the boat and the two fishermen waited.

When the line handler on the little boat felt the tug of the line getting caught in the assault craft’s propeller, (something like the feel of a big fish hitting a hook, I suppose) he let go of the chain. Then the inevitable happened. The line wrapped around the propeller shaft until the heavy chain was sucked into the propeller.

Bang! The first assault craft was put out of action.

The second landing craft met the same fate and then the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth. They were all stopped dead in their tracks.

Meanwhile, the Admiral, forced to accept the superior military strategy of the ragtag Viequense fishermen, called a halt to the exercise and just as Taso had declared to the press, not one marine landed on Blue Beach that morning.

The Arrest of the Vieques 21
In 1979, the Navy apparently decided to change tactics. They initiated a public relations program, the purpose of which was to improve the Navy’s public image while disparaging the image of the protesters. A Spanish-speaking lieutenant, a shadowy character named Alex de la Zerda, was assigned as the US Navy public relations liaison in Vieques.

So it was on May 19, 1979, when protesters gathered on Blue Beach where a practice amphibious assault was planned by both the US Navy and several other nations that had paid to participate in the practice.(1)

That morning, a flotilla of some 30 fishing boats left Esperanza carrying more than 150 protestors including a Catholic Bishop, an Episcopal minister and a Methodist minister.

The boats proceeded to Blue Beach. The demonstrators came ashore and began an interdenominational prayer vigil on the beach. About an hour into the service, a US Navy landing craft and a small fleet of military vehicles arrived at the beach and 30 armed federal marshals moved in on the demonstrators.

Some, like the clergymen, surrendered peacefully. Others, like Ismael Guadalupe, the president of the Crusade for the Rescue of Vieques, resisted and had to be subdued, handcuffed and physically dragged away.

The Navy’s new public relations officer was on hand. Lieutenant La Zerda indicated to the marshals who were to be arrested and who were not.

Although the vast majority of the demonstrators were fishermen and their families from Vieques, only two of those arrested, Ismael Guadalupe and Ivan Davis, were Viequenses and only one, Ivan Davis, was a fisherman. Although the demonstrators came from a broad spectrum of political beliefs, all of those arrested, again except for Davis, could be identified in some way or another with independentista or left wing ideologies.

According to Arturo Meléndez López, in his book La Batalla de Vieques: "The arrest and subsequent sentencing of the 'Vieques 21' had as its objective, to try to demonstrate that the struggle against the presence of the Navy from Vieques was not the struggle of the Viequense people, but rather that of separatists from the Big Island."

What about Ivan Davis, a fisherman, a Viequense and a political moderate?

When lawyers representing the arrestees arrived at the Federal Court on the Big Island the next day to talk to their clients, Ivan Davis was nowhere to be found. A telephone call to Vieques revealed that Davis was back home. When the attorneys asked him what happened, Davis replied that he didn’t know why, but he was visited in his cell by a federal marshal, who gave him a sandwich and a soda and told him to go home. He left through the back door and returned to Vieques on the public ferry. No charges were filed against him.

The protesters were charged with trespassing on federal property.

Bishop Antulio Parrilla was sentenced to one year of probation and forbidden to return to Vieques. All the others were sentenced to prison, most receiving the maximum penalty of six month of incarceration and a $500.00 fine. One of those who were sentenced Ángel Rodríguez Cristóbal, a member of the Puerto Rican Socialist League, was found dead in his jail cell under suspicious circumstances two months after beginning his six month period of incarceration.

The same day that Alex de la Zerda was coordinating arrests of anti-navy demonstrators at Blue Beach inside Camp Garcia, a pro-Navy counter demonstration took place just outside the gate to the camp. The theme was that the anti-Navy protesters were not from Vieques and were radical leftists, a hypothesis that would be presented to the media, supported by the great proportion of non-Viequenses and leftists among those who were arrested.

“The pro-Navy faction carried placards reading, ‘Navy Yes, Communists No,’ Socialists Go Home’ and ‘Vieques for the Viequenses.’

“The protest was organized by Mike Ferris, a former executive with General Electric’s plant on Vieques and Roberto Lopez, a local businessman.” (2)

The local businessman, Roberto Lopez, was also an anti-Castro Cuban, who owned a firing range on Vieques and a gun shop in San Juan. He was also was the organizer and one of the leaders of the Pro-Navy Vanguard, a militant group supported primarily by North American interests.

On January of 1980, both Alex de la Zerda and Roberto Lopez Gonzalez along with another anti-Castro Cuban, René Fernández Del Valle were arrested for the bombing of the Puerto Rican Bar Association, members of which had been defending, without charge, the Viequense fishermen accused of crimes of civil disobedience.

They were also accused of plotting to place a bomb on a Vieques Air Link flight, carrying anti-Navy protest leaders, including Carlos Zenón, head of the Fishermen’s Association, and attorneys working on the Vieques 21 trial. (3)

The trial of the alleged bombers was presided over by the same judge who sentenced the Vieques 21 protesters and “although the prosecution presented, among other evidence, taped conversations between de la Zerda and a Navy ordinance man, Terrence Davis, an explosives specialist with access to weapons stored in the magazines in western Vieques, discussing the acquisition of explosives and comments that indicated that de la Zerda plotted to bomb the Vieques Air Link flight in an effort to eliminate attorneys representing the Vieques fishermen, a jury ultimately acquitted all three men.” (4)

(1) The average yearly income gained from the leasing of Vieques and its surrounding waters to foreign nations for practice bombings was about 80 million dollars.

(2) From the San Juan Star May 20, 1979, “Navy Nets 21 Protesters,” by Manny Suarez.

(3) The Vieques Air Link bombing was aborted when Lopez’s daughter who was studying in San Juan boarded the same flight at the last minute. (From Taso, Un Pedazo de Vieques)

(4) From Military Power and Popular Protest, Katherine T. McCaffrey presenting material reported in the San Juan Star.

This change of tactics by the navy was indeed effective in undermining the protest movement, because even though most Viequenses were adamantly opposed to the Navy bombing, their opposition was ecologically, culturally and economically grounded and definitely not political. They did not want to be labeled anti-American, independentista or socialist.

Memorandum of Understanding
In 1978, Puerto Rico Governor, Carlos Romero-Barceló and others had brought suit against the navy for a violation of environmental laws. In 1983, the governor dropped the lawsuit in exchange for navy promises made by the navy to bring industry and employment to Vieques and to protect the island’s environment. This agreement called the Memorandum of Understanding is also referred to as the Fortin Accord, because it was signed at the old Fort in Isabel Segunda on Vieques.

Although it has been overwhelmingly recognized by the US and Puerto Rican Government as well as by the people of Vieques that the promises made by the navy in the Memorandum of Understanding were never fulfilled, the accord at first filled the people of Vieques with hope and for a time diffused the protest movement.

1999 US Government report to the Secretary of Defense by the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques in respect to the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Island of Vieques:

Navy Promises
In 1983, the Governor of Puerto Rico and the Acting Secretary of the Navy signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that covered four broad areas: Community Assistance, Land Use, Ordnance Delivery in the Inner Range on Vieques, and Environmental Matters.

With respect to community assistance the Navy committed to strive to improve the welfare of the people of Vieques. This initiative was to include every meaningful effort, working with Commonwealth agencies and groups, to obtain full employment on the island.

In the case of land use the Navy agreed to actively consult with the Commonwealth Department of Natural Resources on the most beneficial and compatible uses of Navy lands. Agreement on ordnance included safety, absolute minimum utilization of explosive ordnance consistent with national defense needs, and notification of the Commonwealth, through the Secretary of the Commonwealth State Department, 15 days prior to the conduct of major exercises on Vieques.

The provisions of the MOU on environmental matters covered a range of issues including ecosystems and conservation zones, endangered species, noise and historic preservation. A Management Advisory Committee comprised of representatives of the Navy, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Forest Service and the Commonwealth Department of Natural Resources was established to facilitate the resolution of environmental problems and concerns.

Conclusions of the Panel
The Panel is convinced that the Navy was initially committed and sincere in its efforts to live up to the agreements reflected in the MOU. Programs were initiated with the high hope that they would encourage economic development and foster employment opportunities on the island. Unfortunately, for a myriad of reasons, some legitimate and some the result of inattention or neglect, those economic development initiatives failed. In significant part, this failure can be attributed to poor planning and to poor execution on the part of the Navy.

In addition, information provided to the Panel during its hearings and through other submissions led the Panel to conclude, as did Representative Dellums who chaired the HASC Special Panel in 1981, that "insensitivity has been the hallmark of the Navy’s approach" with respect to community relations. The formulation of the 1983 MOU provided an exception to this pattern, but it is clear that the performance of the Navy in meeting its obligations under the MOU has been inadequate in recent years. It is also clear that the improved relations between the Navy and the community following agreement on the MOU was an exception to a general condition of poor relations between the Navy and the community of Vieques.

Just as significant are the health and noise concerns of the residents of Vieques and their representatives. The Panel notes with concern the lack of good data concerning the health of the residents of Vieques, particularly with respect to the incidence of cancer. Though the incidence of cancer is reported to be very high on the island, there is little indication of sincere and sustained efforts on the part of the Navy to assist the government of Puerto Rico in identifying what could be the cause(s) of high cancer rates. Again, there appears to be an insensitivity and a detached approach to the concerns of the residents of Vieques. Likewise, complaints concerning the noise associated with military operations from the residents of Vieques have had little effect on either the tempo or conduct of operations by the Navy.

Included in the MOU is a commitment by the Navy that "to the greatest extent possible and consistent with national defense needs, the Navy will maintain the utilization of explosive ordnance at an absolute minimum." Data before the Panel indicates that the percentage of live ordnance used at Vieques in relationship to inert ordnance has significantly increased beginning in fiscal year 1996. Moreover, the percentage of live ordnance in relation to inert ordnance in the early 1990s was about twice that reported in the late 1970s. While this increase may be warranted based on changing methods of weapons delivery, this is all the more reason to limit both live and inert ordnance to the elements of training that cannot effectively be conducted elsewhere. This limitation would serve to significantly reduce the amount of live ordnance expended and the number of days during the year in which operational training is conducted.

On the other hand, the Navy has done a commendable job in addressing some of the environmental challenges on the island. Working with agencies of the Federal government and the Commonwealth, some programs are models of excellence, equal to or better than those found at other U.S. bases. For example, the Navy has taken steps to protect the endangered species through the establishment of seven conservation zones.

Conservation Zones

Shaded areas mark areas that were used for artillery parctice and are now restricted to the public because of the possible presence of unexploded ordance. Note overlap of conservation zones.

Report of the Special Commission to the Governor of Puerto Rico
" the constant violations, in both the spirit and the letter, of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding, by the Navy, together with the limitations inherent therein, have made it a totally ineffective instrument to protect the interests of the population of Vieques, vis-à-vis the activities of the Navy."

Statement of Carlos Romero-Barceló to the Subcommittee on Military Readiness
… In 1977, during my first term as Governor of Puerto Rico, I filed action in U.S. District Court to enjoin the Navy from using Vieques for weapons training purposes citing violations of Federal and Puerto Rico statutes, executive orders and constitutional provisions. In 1979, U.S. District Judge Juan Torruella found that the Navy was in technical violation of three statutes: the National Environmental Policy Act; Executive Order 11593 by failing to nominate historical sites; and the Clean Water Act.

After the above decision was upheld through the appeals process, the Government of Puerto Rico and the Department of the Navy entered into negotiations to set forth the legal framework for all Navy operations in Vieques and set standards and goals for Navy and Puerto Rico cooperation that culminated in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in September 1983. Contrary to the provisions in the MOU, the Navy escalated and expanded its range of operations in Vieques after the mid 1980's.

The Navy offered the range for use by foreign militaries and commercial and other users, such as weapons and munitions manufacturers, on a reimbursable basis, highlighting the assets and features of the weapons range in Vieques in a website. This outrageous offer was withdrawn after it became a public issue after the April 19 tragic accident.

In a blatant violation of the letter and the spirit of the MOU, the Navy used hazardous weapons, and toxic bombs and other munitions, including napalm, depleted uranium bullets, and cluster bombs that are banned for use near civilian populations. These actions not only constitute a callous disregard, but a flagrant and crass violation of both the terms and the spirit of the MOU.

Navy environmental projects undertaken as a result of the Fortin Accord (Military Power and Popular Protest)

Sea turtles eggs were collected from beaches used for amphibious assault maneuvers and were relocated to a cage on the north shore. Cost $70,000.

Ten bohios (wooden shelters) were built on beaches on Navy land. Cost $35,000
Navy planted 150 acres of Mahogany trees. Cost $500,000. (The mahogany trees were later uprooted and destroyed for the placement of the Navy ROTHR complex)

Signs proclaimed certain areas as “Environmentally Sensitive Conservation Zones” and access was prohibited.

Navy declared Isla Conejo as an environmental reserve for nesting Brown Pelicans.

Trapping Jueyes was prohibited.

No action was taken on toxic waste dumping or weapons testing cleanup.

The Civil Disobedience Camps

On April 19, 1999, the pilot of an FA 18 fighter jet practicing bombing maneuvers on Vieques missed the target zone and dropped a 500 pound bomb in the vicinity of the an observation post (OP 1), killing Viequense security guard, David Sanes and injuring four others.

The community was outraged and members of the Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques and local fishermen organized a combination memorial service and civil disobedience action.

Among the demonstrators was the environmentalist, Alberto de Jesus, better known as Tito Kayak. True to his nickname, Tito Kayak had paddled his kayak all the way from the Big Island in order to arrive in Vieques and take part in the protest demonstration.

Tito Kayak was already well known for his high profile acts of civil disobedience.
In New York City, he had slipped out a window inside the Statue of Liberty, climbed up on the crown and unfurled the Puerto Rican and Vieques flags, along with a banner which read, “Paz Para Vieques.” Running out of line with which to tie the last part of the banner, he called to his friends who were inside to take the laces off of his sneakers so he would be able to finish the job.

In Vieques, Tito Kayak had paddled over to a navy warship and, while TV cameras were rolling and sailors on deck were attempting to upset his kayak with high pressure fire hoses, succeeded in painting his “Peace for Vieques” message in large red letters on the hull of the battleship.

In San Juan, Tito Kayak had placed a large banner on top of a 150-foot-high scaffold near the Plaza Las Americas shopping center "No to Plutonium" to protest the voyage of the vessel Pacific Swan that was scheduled to transport a cargo of the highly radioactive metal, plutonium, through the Mona Passage, the channel that separates Puerto Rico from Hispaniola.

Two days after the errant missile took the life of David Sanes; protesters boarded fishing boats at the dock in Esperanza and were taken to the bombing range. Once there, they planned to participate in a quiet ceremony of prayer, place a giant cross on the mountain near where David Sanes was killed and then return to Esperanza.

Things did not go entirely as planned. Tito Kayak announced that he intended to stay on the bombing range, protect the memorial crucifix and act as a human shield to stop the bombing. His words to his fellow protesters later became the rallying cry of the struggle, “ni una bomba mas.” (Not one more bomb.)

The organizers of the demonstration had not anticipated this turn of events. Tito Kayak’s independent action was bucking the established order of things, whereby tactics were discussed and voted on by committee members. The protest organizers asked Tito Kayak to reconsider. He refused. The demonstrators then returned to the beach, boarded the waiting yolas and motored back downwind to Esperanza. Tito Kayak remained on the range, alone.

The next morning, one of Carlos and Eleida Zenón’s sons, Cacimar Zenón, brought food, water and supplies to Tito Kayak and decided to stay on the bombing range along with Tito.

The next day, Pablo Connelly, the son of Charlie Connelly and Myrna Pagan, editors of the Vieques Times, a newspaper highly critical of the Navy, joined the two courageous young men on the range, an area littered with unexploded bombs and soil and water contaminated with depleted uranium and other toxic substances.

Pablo Connelly, addressing a group of visitors to the camps said, “I know that there is a great danger. I know that the risks are great, but all the risks are worth it. I do this for my children and for the children of all Viequenses and I know that during the time that I remain here not a single bomb will fall on Vieques.”

Over the course of the following year, what was once considered a provocative and crazy idea became mainstream thinking among the anti navy activists. In addition to the original camp, known as Monte David, more than one dozen other groups set up camps on the bombing range, including Ruben Barrios of the Puerto Rico Independence Party (PIP), schoolteachers, labor unions and religious organizations.

Carlos, Cacimar and Yauribo Zenón at the Monte David Camp

Supporters arrived daily from the Big Island, from the United States mainland and from abroad. Many well known public figures such as Hillary Clinton, Jesse Jackson, the Governor of New York, George Pataki, the Dalai Lama, actors Martin Sheen and Edward James Olmos and singers Jose Feliciano and Ricky Martin publicly expressed their solidarity with the protesters.

This resolve, of “not one more bomb” was shared by not only the vast majority of the population of Vieques but also by the people of Puerto Rico, the religious establishment and by all the Puerto Rican political parties, at least for a while.

On January 31, 2000, President Clinton issued a directive, which would allow the Navy to continue their training exercises on Vieques until May 1, 2003. By the terms of the directive, a referendum would take place in a year’s time whereby the citizens of Vieques could choose either to accept the three years of bombing or to allow indefinite naval exercises on the island. Vieques would be given $40 million in aid. If they chose to allow the navy to remain on the island, an additional $50 million would be allotted. In addition, the directive promised to return 8200 acres of land in the western portion of the island to the municipality on December 31, 2000.

(Congress changed the directive and the result was that 4,000 acres were returned to the municipality on May 1, 2001. Three thousand one hundred acres were turned over to the Department of the Interior to be managed fy the Department of Fish and Wildlife as a Wildlife Preserve, 700 acres were given to the Puerto Rico Department of Natural Resources and 200 acres (the ROTHR site and the radar installation at the top of Mount Pirata) were kept by the navy.)

The referendum did not include the choice of an immediate withdrawal of the navy from Vieques, and was soundly rejected by protest organizations and the Puerto Rican churches.

"Never again shall we tolerate abuse which no community in any of the fifty states would ever be asked to tolerate. We, the people of Puerto Rico, have graduated from colonial passivity, Ni una bomba más. Never again shall we tolerate such abuse. Not for sixty years...and not for sixty minutes."
Puerto Rico Governor Pedro Rosselló before the Senate Armed Services Committee October 19, 1999

Despite having emphatically endorsed the “no more bombs” policy, the Governor of Puerto Rico, Pedro Rosselló, signed the agreement.

Religious leaders in Puerto Rico organized what turned out to be the largest mass demonstration in the history of Puerto Rico in opposition to the Governor’s authorization of the directive.

On May 4, 2000 at the break of dawn, helicopters bearing heavily armed federal marshals landed in the impact zone. The occupants of the camps were apprehended, handcuffed, and carried away. Their camps were razed to make way for a new wave of bombing.

Many protesters served time in prison, including important public figures.

Environmental lawyer Robert F. Kennedy Jr. was sentenced to 30 days in prison for trespassing.

The Reverend Al Sharpton was also arrested for trespassing and given a 90-day prison sentence.

Jacqueline Jackson, the wife of the Rev. Jesse Jackson, spent 10 days in jail for protesting on Vieques.

Puerto Rican Sen. Norma Burgos was sentenced to 40 days in jail, but when she suggested the judge put the Navy on trial instead of the demonstrators, the judge added 20 days to her sentence.

New York City Councilman Adolfo Carrión, Bronx Democratic Chairman Roberto Ramirez and New York State Assemblyman José Rivera, were sentenced to 40 days in prison.

New York union leader Dennis Rivera was given 30 days.

Puerto Rico Independence Party President, Rubén Berríos, was sentenced to four months in jail.

Also arrested and sentenced to jail were actor, Edward James Olmos and U.S. Representative, Luis Gutierrez of Illinois as were many other protesters.

In June of 2001, US President George W. Bush announced the end of military maneuvers on Vieques beginning May 1, 2003. The referendum, the outcome of which would have certainly been against further bombing, was cancelled.

Fish and Wildlife
Most of the former navy controlled lands of Vieques have been transferred to the Department of the Interior to be managed by the Department of Fish and Wildlife as a Wildlife Preserve, making Vieques the home of the largest Wildlife Preserve in the Caribbean.

The 900 acres in the former Live Impact Zone will be managed as a “Wilderness Area” where all public access is prohibited.

Public access is also prohibited to the majority of the Wildlife Preserve lands on the island.

According to the Department of Fish and Wildlife, the former Navy bombing range and training facilities on Vieques have been designated as a national wildlife refuge because “in ecological terms, parts of the island are very valuable, Vieques has one of the best dry sub-tropical forests in the Caribbean and it is home to at least four endangered plant species and ten endangered animal species.”

Many Viequenses feel that the designation of the former bombing range as a Wilderness Area is inconsistent with the definition of “Wilderness Area” in the Wilderness Act, which defines said areas as places “where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man.”

It is also felt that the designation of the former Navy-controlled land as a Wildlife refuge, will limit the scope and timeliness of the promised clean up of these lands by the Navy. For example, the level of cleanup for lands where human beings are not allowed is less than for areas where people would have access or for where people could live.

The cleanup of the former Navy bombing range on the 45-square-mile island of Kahoolawe, Hawaii has cost $460 million so far. This year the Navy had dedicated $2 million for the clean up of Vieques.

Meanwhile people on Vieques, where the cancer rate is 27% higher than on the island of Puerto Rico, feel that the continued presence of depleted uranium dust, explosive residues and heavy metals along with possible other contaminants, which have not yet been revealed is causing serious health problems for the people living on the island.

Perceptions of the land transfer to the Department of the Interior

Charlie Connelly and Myrna Pagán write the Vieques Times. The following article is like they say “a blatant generalization,” but it rings true to our ears as well

Navy Out…Wildlife In

"Most people agreed: It was good to get the bombing stopped.

"…So you won, you got what you wanted…

"Haven’t won yet. All we got was a change of uniforms. The fence is still there, the guards are still there, with the guns and the bullet-proof vests – and the biggest chunk of Vieques is still off limits to the people of Vieques. Even if they let us in to one of the beaches, we can’t stay to watch the sunset, they throw us out before six, carloads of armed guards… What’s this all about?

E.S., a visitor from New Zealand, thought the beaches were impressive but didn’t feel comfortable. Why? “Not used to SWAT teams patrolling a nature preserve…”

So how does this play on the island.

In a blatant generalization we observe that:

The English-speaking sector is tickled pink with the FWS presence.

FEW is a Federal agency, not Puerto Rican. They will protect us from Puerto Rican squatters and off-island developers. And the largest Wildlife refuge in the Caribbean looks great in the tourism brochures.

The mainstream Spanish-speaking sector and the scientific community are concerned that the –

Wildlife Refuge and the fenced-off Wilderness Refuge designation will provide the Navy with a cop-out for limited cleanup. The decontamination policy could be less stringent for an unpopulated area as opposed to a zone suitable for human habitation. The fear is that toxic contaminants left in the ground will (and do) migrate to the civilian sector.

The landless –

See vast tracts reserved for lizards and rodents and little hope to find land on which to build a home for their families.

The political activists –

See FWS as trustees for the Navy estate. They warn that the Navy could be simply cooling its heals somewhere backstage awaiting the cue to come storming back. FWS is working with Navy funds and has hired the same civilian (armed) guards the Navy used for patrols (and often for informers). A protest movement against FWS is already forming."
Vieques Times July Issue - Volume 149